Opportunities for central (regional) government to intervene in decisions and operations of local governments in Hungary by Hoffman, István
30 IA     2021    No. 1 31IA     2021    No. 1Opportunities for central (regional) government to intervene in decisions and operations... Opportunities for central (regional) government to intervene in decisions and operations...
Abstract: The regulation of the relationship between central and 
local government in Hungary has undergone significant transfor-
mation in the last decade. The government has robust tools to 
control local activities, just these tools are rarely applied by the 
supervising authorities. The main transformation of this relation-
ship can be observed in the field of public services. The formerly 
municipality-based public service system was transformed into 
a centrally organised and provided model, thus the role of local 
governments in Hungary has decreased. The centralisation pro-
cess was strengthened by reforms during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Keywords: centralisation, decentralisation, legal supervision, 
central government, municipalities, Hungary 
1. EVOLUTION OF HUNGARIAN 
LEGAL SUPERVISION OF 
MUNICIPALITIES 
1.1. THE BEGINNING: 
REGULATION BEFORE THE 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
A continental (mainly German) municipal mod-
el was followed by Hungary before World War II. 
The legal supervision of municipalities evolved 
during the second half of the 19th century. The 
local municipalities (communities) were su-
pervised by county self-governments, and the 
counties were supervised by county governors 
(főispán) who were appointed by the Govern-
ment. Before 1907, the decisions of the county 
governor could be appealed to the Minister of In-
terior, so there was no judicial control. In 1907 a 
new court mechanism was introduced, the war-
ranty complaint, thus the decisions of the coun-
ty governor could be revised by the Hungarian 
Royal Administrative Court. 
This system remained in place until the end of 
World War II. After World War II, a Soviet-type 
system was introduced in 1950, and the self-gov-
ernance of the counties and municipalities were 
abolished by Act I of 1950 on the Councils. This 
system was partially changed in 1971. Act I of 
1971 on the Councils (the third act on the coun-
cils) revamped the system. The partial self-gov-
ernance of the councils was recognised by the new 
Act, although they remained local agencies of the 
central government as well. Therefore, the county 
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councils and the local councils were not directed 
by the central government, their actions and deci-
sions were supervised. The decisions and actions 
of the counties were supervised by an organ of the 
Council	 of	 the	 Ministers	 (Office	 for	 County	 and	
Local Councils of the Council of Ministers) and the 
decisions and operation of the local councils were 
supervised by the county councils. Although there 
was supervision, the decisions of the supervisory 
authorities could not be revised by the courts. A 
transitional model evolved: it was not a pure Sovi-
et-type model, but it was different from the liberal 
models, as well. 
1.2. THE REGULATION OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION  
(1990-2010) 
In 1990, with the Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Hungary and the new Act 
on Local Self-governments (Act LXV of 1990, 
hereinafter: Ötv) the former councils were re-
placed by self-governments. The concept of the 
Ötv was based on the European Charter of Local 
Self-Governments, but the rights and autonomies 
of the local self-governments were even broader. 
The ‘fundamental rights’ of the local self-govern-
ments were regulated by Section 44/A of the Con-
stitution,1 the Hungarian regulation was based 
on the approach of inherent (local government) 
rights, similar to the Jeffersonian concept of local 
self-governments.2
The control of the legality of local government 
actions was based on the French model, on the 
reformed French municipal model of the Loi Def-
ferre.3	 This	 task	was	 fulfilled	 from	 1990	 to	 1994	
by	the	Republic’s	Commissioner	(whose	office	was	
organised at regional level), from 1994 to 2006 by 
the	County	Administrative	Offices	and	from	2007	
to 31 December 2008 by the Regional Adminis-
trative	Offices.4 The supervising bodies could not 
suspend the implementation of the local govern-
ment decisions, they could only initiate a review 
procedure at the Constitutional Court. This was 
an exclusive of right of these bodies. The Consti-
tutional Court had the right to annul local gov-
ernment decrees. Besides this, on the grounds of 
unconstitutionality, an actio popularis could be 
filed	 by	 anyone	 against	 unconstitutional	 local	
government decrees. Other local government de-
cisions could be contested/challenged at the (or-
dinary) courts.5 Beyond the individual acts ruling 
on subjective rights and obligations according to 
the Administrative Procedure Act, self-govern-
ment decisions could only be litigated by the head 
of	the	(county)	administrative	office	as	the	super-
vising	authority	after	an	unsuccessful	notification	
procedure. Decisions, including local government 
resolutions, could be annulled in these processes 
by the courts.
Although the regulation on legal supervision and 
the judicial review was up-to-date, several dys-
functions occurred in practice. The main reasons 
for this were the extra-legal problem of scarce 
resources. On the one hand, the legality control 
units within central government agencies were 
quite small: only about 300-350 posts were cre-
ated for this task.6 An average legality controller 
had to control all the issues of 10 municipalities. 
The central government agency – according to the 
adapted French model – could only initiate a ju-
dicial review of local government decisions. The 
competence for annulment lay with the courts 
(local government resolutions) or with the Consti-
tutional Court of the Republic of Hungary (local 
government decrees). These bodies could also sus-
pend the implementation of decisions. The courts 
and the newly organised Constitutional Court 
had	significant	resource	problems:	the	procedures	
were	often	delayed,	which	hampered	the	efficien-
cy of the legal protection.7
A weak tools for the prevention of the omission of 
the municipal bodies were introduced by the mu-
nicipal system of the Democratic Transition: Act 
XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court stat-
ed that an action is missed by a public body and 
the Constitution and especially the fundamental 
rights are infringed by the omission, the omission 
could be stated by the Constitutional Court and it 
obliges to terminate it.8 
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Similarly, as an ultima ratio of the supervision sys-
tem,	 the	dissolution	of	a	municipal	council	 (offi-
cially called a ‘body of representatives’ in Hunga-
ry, and as an ‘assembly’ in the counties, the capital 
and towns with county status – after the Demo-
cratic Transition) by the Parliament was institu-
tionalised. If the Constitution was permanently 
infringed by the activity of a body of represent-
atives (essentially the council) of a municipality, 
this body could be dissolved by the Parliament. 
This procedure was very complicated, full of guar-
antees. The procedure had to be initiated by the 
Government, with the initiative based on the legal 
supervision of the county agency of the Govern-
ment. This initiative had to be commented on by 
the Constitutional Court, giving its opinion. After 
that the Parliament decided, but in the parliamen-
tary debate the municipality could take part. It 
was a very rare tool in the Hungarian system, only 
2 municipal bodies were dissolved between 1990 
and 2010 (there were 5 municipal terms and more 
than 3200 municipalities in Hungary). 
The legal supervision, as well as the judicial and 
constitutional review of the local government 
decisions, required a reform which was achieved 
by the Fundamental Law of Hungary and subse-
quently Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on Local Self-Gov-
ernments of Hungary (hereinafter: Mötv). 
2. TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
HUNGARIAN SYSTEM
2.1. TRANSFORMATION OF 
LEGAL SUPERVISION 
In 2011, a shared competence system was intro-
duced by Article 24 and Article 25 (2) c) of the 
Fundamental Law and by Section 136 of the Mötv. 
Since then, the right to review the legality of lo-
cal government decrees belongs to the Local Gov-
ernment Senate of the Curia, Hungary’s supreme 
court, which can annul local government decrees 
if regulations of an act of Parliament or of decrees 
by central government bodies are violated. A local 
government decree can be annulled by the Con-
stitutional Court if it is unconstitutional. The de-
limitation of the powers of these two bodies was 
uncertain, but Decision 3097/2012 of the Consti-
tutional Court (published on 26 July) stated that 
the constitutional complaint or motion can only 
be decided by the Constitutional Court if it refers 
exclusively to a breach of the Fundamental Law. 
If there is also a question of legality, not only of 
constitutionality, the Constitutional Court’s lack 
of competence is declared and the complaint or 
motion is transferred to the Curia. This regulation 
was partially transformed after 2017. The Con-
stitutional Court stated its competence in cases 
where not only the Fundamental Law but other 
Acts of Parliament are infringed, if fundamental 
rights are seriously harmed by the municipal de-
cree [Decision 7/2017 (published on 18 April)].9 
The legal supervision of local government deci-
sions is performed by the County (Capital) Gov-
ernment	 Offices.	 Their	 competence	 is	 regulated	
by the Mötv. and by Act CXXV of 2018 on the Ad-
ministration of the Government.10 The ombuds-
man can examine the legality and harmony with 
fundamental rights of local government decrees 
as well. The judicial review of a local government 
decree can thus be initiated either by the county 
(capital)	 government	 offices	 or	 by	 the	 ombuds-
man. The procedures of the Curia can be initiated 
by the judge of a litigation too, if the illegality of a 
local government decree that should be applied in 
the case is probable. An a posteriori constitutional 
review of the Constitutional Court can be initiated 
by the judge of the given court case, by the om-
budsman and by the Government of Hungary. The 
latter is based on the notice of the Government 
Representative (head of the county or capital gov-
ernment	office)	 and	on	 the	proposal	of	 the	min-
ister responsible for the legal supervision of local 
governments (now the Minister leading the Prime 
Minister’s	Office).
The omission procedure is a new element of the 
system. As I mentioned, the previous model 
institutionalised a weak tool. In the new mod-
el, the Curia can declare that a local govern-
ment failed to adopt a decree. If a resolution 
or service provision has been missed by the 
municipality, the responsibility belongs to the 
designated county (and Budapest) courts (8 of 
the 20 county courts), which have administra-
tive branches (these courts actually operate on 
a regional level). The procedure has been reg-
ulated by Act I of 2017 on the Code of Adminis-
trative Court Procedure since 2018. A case can 
only be initiated by the county government of-
fice if a municipal decree has not been passed, 
and it can be initiated by the county govern-
ment office and by the party assuming an in-
dividual infringement.11 In Hungarian public 
law, the authorisation for adopting a decree 
can stem from an obligation of the legislator. 
Although the local governments also have 
original legislative powers, several important 
subjects of these original powers are listed by 
the Mötv. An omission procedure is justified 
by the failure to adopt a decree in these fields. 
Similarly, the county government offices can 
provide the omitted services and adopt a miss-
ing resolution as well. 
Prima facie, full legal protection is provided to 
individuals by this new model of judicial and 
constitutional review. If we take a closer look at 
the regulation, several lacunas can be noticed. 
The main problem is that individuals affected 
cannot initiate the judicial review of a local gov-
ernment decree directly. As mentioned above, 
only the judge of the case, the ombudsman 
and the county government office, may submit 
a request to the Curia. The procedure aims to 
safeguard public interest first of all, while safe-
guarding subjective rights and positions only 
applies as a secondary aim. Although individ-
uals can submit a constitutional complaint to 
the Constitutional Court against the decisions 
of the courts, the success of these procedures 
is highly doubtful, as a local government de-
cree rarely violates the Fundamental Law only, 
without being contrary to lower sources of law. 
Unconstitutional local government decrees of-
ten violate an act of Parliament or a decree of 
a central government body, and – if the consti-
tutional complaint is based on the unconstitu-
tionality of the applied decree – the decree can-
not be reviewed by the Constitutional Court for 
lack of competence.12 Only the Curia is author-
ised by the new constitution and by the Court 
Act to conduct a judicial review of the legality 
of local government decrees. Other hindrances 
can stem from the strict legal requirements of 
the admission procedure of the Constitutional 
Court.13 Thus a decision on the merits of the 
complaint rarely occurs.14
Therefore the main problem stems from the lack 
of a remedy similar to the constitutional com-
plaint for local government decrees, which would 
be necessary because of the shared competence 
of	norm	control	 in	 this	field.	The	 judicial	 review	
procedure of the Curia cannot be initiated directly 
by an individual; individuals can merely – and not 
bindingly	–	ask	the	county	government	office,	the	
ombudsman or the judge of the given case to ask 
the Curia for a revision of the legality of the con-
tested local government decree. If an individual 
submits a direct application to the Curia to annul 
a local government decree, or if the Constitution-
al Court transfers such a complaint to the Curia 
because of the shared competence, the application 
or the complaint will be rejected due to the lack of 
standing.15 
Until 2020, the local government body could not 
contest the decision of the Curia before the Con-
stitutional Court. This changed with an amend-
ment of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional 
Court in 2019, thus municipalities have the right 
to submit a constitutional complaint against 
court decisions (including decisions of the Curia) 
that infringe their competences. It is not clear, 
and because of the novelty of the regulation a 
standing practice has not evolved, whether the 
municipalities can or cannot submit successful 
applications against the decisions of the Curia 
based on an infringement of competences, if they 
do not agree with the decisions of the court. So 
far there has been one single complaint against 
the resolution of the Curia, and it was rejected 
based on the logic of the regulation before the 
2019 Amendment. In this case, a local govern-
ment appealed the resolution of the Curia, and 
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the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint. 
In the practice of the Constitutional Court, the 
local government cannot submit a constitution-
al complaint because it can only be submitted on 
the grounds of a violation of fundamental human 
rights. According to the interpretation of the 
Constitutional Court, local governments have 
no fundamental rights, they just have “compe-
tences protected by the Constitution”. There is 
no means of contesting, no effective complaint16 
against decisions which infringe the self-govern-
ance of the local governments.17 This practice – 
which does not recognise the right to submit a 
constitutional complaint – is a strong limitation 
to the autonomy of local governments because 
their competences are only partially protected. 
As I mentioned, this regulation changed in early 
2020, but there has not been any relevant case 
based on the amended regulation, therefore its 
impact cannot yet be estimated. 
It is clear that the legal regulation on the control 
of local government decision-making was signif-
icantly transformed after 2012. If we look at the 
actual practice, these procedures are rarely used 
by the supervising authorities. First of all, the 
supervising authorities have limited resources – 
similarly to before. Therefore, they detected a low 
number of infringements during their activities 
(see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 – Number of municipal decrees, other 
municipal decisions and infringements of lo-
cal decisions detected by county / capital gov-
ernment offices in 2019 (Source: OSAP 2019)
If an infringement is detected, the municipalities 
are mainly cooperative: the majority of the calls 
for legality are accepted by the municipal bodies: 
only 1.58% of the calls were rejected in 2019 (see 
Figure 2)
Figure 2 – Legal notices in 2019 (Source: OSAP 
2019)
Because of the lack of the resources and the large 
number of municipal decisions, the focus of legal 
supervision activity of the county government 
offices	was	transformed.	As	I	mentioned	earlier,	
the a priori tools were institutionalised in the 
early 1990s. Legal supervision in Hungary now 
focuses on preventing infringements.18 The main 
tool	 of	 the	 county	 government	 offices	 for	 this	
prevention is the professional aid (assistance) to 
the municipal bodies (see Figure 3)
Figure 3 – Professional aid and legal notices of 
the county (capital) government offices in 2019 
(Source: OSAP 2019)
Therefore, the role of court cases has remined very re-
stricted, and the majority of these cases are not sub-
mitted	by	the	county	(capital)	government	offices,	but	
by the judges of litigations and the ombudsman. Hence 
court cases are mainly based on the protection of sub-
jective rights (private interests) and not on the protec-
tion of public interests (see Table 1 and Figure 4).19 
Table 1 Judicial review procedures of the Curia 
from 2012 to 2020 
Year Mainly protection of public interest Protection of public and private interests
Omission cases Judicial review of municipal 
decrees initiated by county 
government offices 
Judicial review of municipal 
decrees initiated by judges of 
litigation
Judicial review of municipal 
decrees initiated by the 
ombudsman
2012 5 34 10 0
2013 6 27 24 3
2014 13 10 9 1
2015 2 14 26 9
2016 0 24 22 1
2017 4 9 22 2
2018 4 6 21 1
2019 3 8 27 1
2020 3 6 23 0
Source: the author, based on Municipal Decree de-
cisions of the Curia, see: https://kuria-birosag.hu/
hu/onkugy)
Figure 4 – Judicial review procedures of the Curia 
from 2012 to 2020 (in total) 
2.2. NEW TOOLS FOR 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO 
INTERVENE: DELIMITATION OF 
FINANCIAL AUTONOMY OF THE 
MUNICIPALITIES 
The paradigm of the relationship between central 
and local government was radically transformed 
by the new Hungarian Constitution, by the Fun-
damental Law.20 The former regulation was based 
on the passive role of the central government, but 
now it has responsibilities which provide it with 
strong and active intervention into local affairs. 
First of all, as I mentioned, a missed decision can 
be	 made	 up	 by	 the	 County	 Government	 Offic-
es. Although these procedures are rare (3-6 each 
year), it provides for the possibility of the central 
intervention. 
Secondly, if an obligation based on international 
law or European Law is jeopardised by the munic-
ipalities, the Government can do it instead. The 
main reason was that several omissions and in-
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fringements of the municipalities caused proce-
dures against (the central government of) Hungary 
at the European Court of Justice. To prevent these 
procedures, the Government has the possibility to 
take municipal decisions instead.21 Although it is 
clear that the political question doctrine could be 
applied for these cases, the resolution of the gov-
ernment can be sued by the municipalities. 
During the 2000s, municipal debt was a great chal-
lenge. The new Municipal Code, the Mötv. and the 
Act on the Economic Stability of Hungary have reg-
ulations to prevent municipal indebtedness. First 
of all, municipalities are not permitted to plan an 
annual	operational	deficit	in	their	budget,	deficits	
can be planned only for investments and develop-
ments. Secondly, permission of the Government 
is required for municipal borrowing (in principle). 
These resolutions cannot be sued by the munici-
palities. The investment decisions of municipali-
ties	are	subject	to	significant	control	by	the	(cen-
tral) government. This control is strengthened by 
the centralisation of the national management of 
the EU Cohesion Funds. Since the majority of lo-
cal investments and developments are co-funded 
by the EU cohesion funds, the central control is 
strengthened by the centralised management.22 
These tendencies were encouraged by the ASP 
system, which is a centrally monitored application 
centre for local budgeting and spending. 
3. TRANSFORMATION OF 
MUNICIPAL TASKS: STRONG 
CENTRALISATION AFTER 
2011/12 
After 2010, the newly elected Hungarian govern-
ment decided to reorganise the system of human 
public services. The main goal of the reform was to 
centralise the maintenance of public institutions 
in	the	fields	of	primary	and	secondary	education,	
health care and social care. Before 2010, most of 
the institutions were maintained by local govern-
ments: e.g. inpatient health care was a compul-
sory task of the counties, primary care was under 
the authority of the municipalities. According to 
government statements there were serious prob-
lems before 2010 in these sectors. The local gov-
ernments	lacked	sufficient	budgetary	resources	to	
maintain their institutions effectively and trans-
parently, therefore only the state administration 
could	 provide	 these	 public	 services	 at	 a	 unified	
high level of quality. Government decision-mak-
ers deemed that only central government control 
is able to ensure equal opportunities in these sec-
tors.23 The Government established agency-type 
central bodies and their territorial units to main-
tain institutions (e.g. schools, hospitals and nurs-
ing	homes)	in	the	aforementioned	three	fields:	
 - health care: National Institute for Quality- and 
Organisational Development in Healthcare and 
Medicines (reorganised in 2015 as the National 
Health Care Service Centre);
 - primary and secondary education: Klebelsberg 
Centre and the Directorates for the School Dis-
tricts for the maintenance of service providers; 
 - vocational	education:	National	Office	of	Voca-
tional Education and Training and Adult Learn-
ing and the (regional) Vocational Training Cen-
tres; 
 - social care and child protection: General Direc-
torate of Social Affairs and Child Protection.
Agencies are widely used types of non-minis-
terial central administration. These bodies are 
usually independent from Government to some 
extent, and are entitled to make rules and indi-
vidual decisions too. Their main advantage is that 
they	concentrate	on	a	few	specific	tasks,	while	the	
ministries can develop policies and adopt rules at 
a higher level.24 Furthermore, agencies as buff-
er	 organisations	 can	provide	 a	much	more	flexi-
ble framework of human resource management 
during personnel downsizing campaigns, which 
are rather frequent in Hungary.25 In spite of their 
(respective) autonomy, agencies often carry out 
political tasks and frequently operate under tight 
governmental or ministerial control.26
Another very important aspect of centralisation is 
the organisational power27 of the Government and 
the minister overseeing these agencies. In accord-
ance with the Fundamental Law, the Government 
may establish government agencies pursuant to 
provisions laid down by law (Art. 15). The origin of 
this power is the authorisation of the Parliament to 
the Executive to implement its program in certain 
sectors and in general. For this purpose, the Govern-
ment must have an appropriate and well-construct-
ed administrative system. The transformation can 
be observed by an analysis of the annual budget of 
the Ministry of Human Capacities, which is now re-
sponsible for the centralised service provision.28 
Table 2 – Total expenditures (in HUF mil-
lion)29 of the budgetary chapter directed by 
the Ministry of Human Capacities 
Year Total expenditures (in HUF million) of the 
budgetary chapter directed by the Ministry of 
Human 








1.7% in 2013, and -0.9% in 2014 based on the data 
of	the	Hungarian	Central	Statistical	Office.30 
Source: Act CLXIX of 2010 on the Budget of the 
Republic of Hungary, Act CLXXXVIII of 2011, Act 
CCIV of 2012, Act CCXXX of 2013, Act C of 2014 
and Act C of 2016 on the Central Budget of Hungary 
In short, the maintenance agencies in these three 
sectors are rather tightly subordinated to the Gov-
ernment and more directly to the Minister of Hu-
man	Capacities.	This	influence	expands	to	the	ter-
ritorial units. Thus, the role of the municipalities 
has	 been	 significantly	 weakened,	 which	 is	 clear	
based on the municipal expenditures.31 In 2010 
the municipal expenditures were 12.5% of GDP 
and in 2017 only 6.3% (in the EU-28, municipal ex-
penditures were 11.9% of GDP in 2010 and 10.7% 
in 2017) (see Figure).
Figure 5 – Local government expenditures (as 
% of GDP) in the EU-28 and in Hungary be-
tween 2010 and 2017 
Source: Eurostat32 
This process has been strengthened by legislation 
after the COVID-19 pandemic. The regulation on 
local taxation was amended, and the shared reve-
nues from the vehicle tax have been centralised, 
while the most important local tax, local business 
tax, has been reduced for small and medium en-
terprises, thus local revenues were reduced and 
national incomes became more centralised. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The regulation on the relationship between cen-
tral and local government in Hungary has under-
gone	 significant	 transformation	 in	 the	 last	 dec-
ade. Although the government has robust tools to 
control local activities, the main transformation 
can	be	observed	 in	the	field	of	 the	public	servic-
es. The former municipality-based public service 
system was transformed into a centrally organised 
and provided model, thus the role of local govern-
ments in Hungary has decreased. 
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